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 1. Introduction 
 
Globalization and the easy access to information and communication technologies allow 
firms to organize their activity and decide their production strategies in a global framework 
(UNCTAD, 2004).  Whether purchasing intermediate goods and services from foreign 
suppliers or locating some parts of the production process in other countries through foreign 
direct investment (FDI), the objective pursued is to maximize production value (Kedia, 
Lahiri, & Lovvorn, 2005). The relocation of the activity in a foreign country is a part of the 
firm’s strategy that allows the externalization of relatively inefficient production processes. 
For firms that operate in very competitive industries and/or those that are performing poorly, 
the international fragmentation of production may be a very effective strategy for cost 
reduction. 
 
The sourcing of intermediate goods and services is considered as a decision problem of 
business firms (Helpman, 2006; Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Olsen, 2006). The firm 
has to consider two dimensions. The first is ownership: the producer must decide whether to 
undertake the activity in-house or whether to purchase the input or service from outside 
through the market (at arm’s length). The second is geography: that is, whether the 
production can be performed domestically or in a foreign country. The interaction of these 
two dimensions allows the firm to choose between four possibilities: insource at home, 
outsource at home, insource abroad and outsource abroad. Thus, following Olsen (2006) 
offshoring refers to the relocation of jobs and processes to any foreign country, which 
includes international outsourcing when the provider is external to the firm and international 
insourcing when the provider is an affiliated firm, captive and outsource offshoring in the 
most often used offshoring governance modes (Manning,  Massini & Lewin, 2008).   
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In Spain, two main waves of intense manufacturing offshoring are observed (Myro & 
Fernandez-Otheo, 2004, 2008). The first took place in the early 1990s; most of the offshoring 
involved the movement of a part of the production chain by firms in traditional and high 
technology-intensive activities; only a few were in medium technology-intensive activities. 
The firms in traditional sectors, textile firms especially, moved part of their production to low 
cost countries such as Morocco, Portugal and China. The firms in high technology-intensive 
sectors moved mainly to European Union countries; more than 90% of these electric and 
electronic firms were foreign. The second wave, which began in 2000 and continues today, is 
rather different: as Myro & Fernandez-Otheo (2008) point out, most of the offshoring is 
undertaken by foreign firms in the high and medium technology-intensive sectors, which look 
to the countries of Eastern European as location substitutes for Spain.  
 
During the last few decades Spain has been an important host country for affiliates of 
multinational companies (Pelegrín, 2002). Venables et al. (2000) shows that from late 1970s 
to the late 1990s the share of all EU manufacturing located in Spain was 6.5%.  A large 
proportion of foreign firms that entered Spain in the 1980s are now offshoring suggesting that 
the country is losing its traditional cost advantage as host country for offshoring activities 
(Pelegrín & Bolance, 2006, 2008).  
 
This study focuses on firms that relocated production process to a foreign country through 
FDI between 1999 and 2005. Using the Olsen (2006) terminology, we call this international 
insourcing (or offshore insourcing). As the scale of this phenomenon is increasing, our main 
objective is to identify the factors that determine international insource, given the importance 
of prior foreign direct investment and the actual prominence of multinationals in offshore 
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 insourcing, Spain constitutes a good laboratory case study. Bearing in mind firm 
heterogeneity, we try to determine which firm characteristics are directly related to the 
strategic decision to restructure the company and to transfer production to a foreign country, 
paying particular attention on the one hand to cost-cutting motives and on the other hand to 
productivity, technology intensity and international experience. The analysis uses a unique 
micro database for Spanish manufacturing firms, a data base specially constructed to 
investigate offshore insourcing in Spain.  Given that most empirical studies of firm or 
industry characteristics and offshoring centre on outsourcing, as far as we know, our study is 
the first on the determinants and firm characteristics of offshore insourcing in Spain and adds 
empirical evidence to the limited data on international insourcing that are currently available. 
We present empirical evidence on the role of firms’ characteristics in the decision to move 
production abroad. 
 
Following on from this introduction, section two presents a review of the main theoretical 
approaches and the empirical literature. Section three describes the data base and introduces 
the econometric methodology. The fourth section reports the estimation results and 
discussion, and we end with a summary and conclusions.  
 
2. Offshoring determinants 
 
Foreign direct investment may be associated directly with offshoring in the form of 
international insourcing. For this to be the case, the FDI must be accompanied by domestic 
employment reductions following the close-down of production processes carried out by the 
foreign affiliate (Olsen, 2006).  
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 In the literature on the determinants of multinational activity, Dunning’s “Eclectic Paradigm” 
suggests that an enterprise's FDI is determined by three types of potential advantages: 
ownership-location-internalisation (OLI) advantages (Dunning, 1981). In other words, FDI is 
determined, first, by the extent to which the enterprise possesses net ownership advantages 
(Hymer, 1960); second, the extent to which it is able to internalise these advantages or, on the 
contrary, must leave them for other enterprises to exploit (Buckley & Casson, 1976); and, 
third, the profitability of locating its production units either at home or abroad (Vernon, 
1966).  
 
An alternative view suggests that a recent change in the reasons underlying FDI is the growth 
in strategic asset-seeking FDI, aimed at protecting or increasing the ownership advantage of 
the investing firm, rather than at exploiting this advantage as is the case of traditional FDI 
(Dunning, 1998). Thus, the location preferences of firms have shifted from traditional 
requirements, such as access to markets and natural resources, to the need to have access to 
knowledge-intensive assets, confined mainly to developed countries, and which are 
characterized by a greater geographical concentration than other kinds of activity (Chung & 
Alcácer, 2002; Kuemmerle, 1999).  
 
Based on Dunning’s “Eclectic Paradigm”, Kedia & Mukherjee (2009) offered a theoretical 
framework for offshoring decisions of firms. The authors suggest that firms go offshore when 
they perceive three types of interrelated advantages: first, advantages derived from the 
disintegration of value chain activities; second, location-specific resourcing advantages, 
which are specific to a country and external to the firm; and third, externalization-related 
advantages, involving externalization to independent foreign providers versus internalization 
via FDI. 
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Offshoring would appear to reaffirm and to challenge the OLI framework. Location, an 
important variable for market-seeking, resourse-seeking and cost minimization strategies, is 
prominent in the apparent motivations for offshoring, but the relevance of ownership and 
internalization advantages are less evident (Doh, 2005). Offshoring implies relocating 
activities to execute international strategies; it is a new variation of FDI (Lewin, Massini & 
Peeters, 2009). 
 
2.1 The role of costs 
 
Much of the offshoring literature follows well-established trends in business 
internationalisation. International outsourcing can be understood from a standard 
international trade perspective, while international insourcing can be understood from the 
literature on multinational activity, but in both cases the basic principle is the relocation of 
activity on the basis of cost (Görg, Greenaway & Kneller, 2008).  
 
The new theories that try to explain the qualitative and quantitative changes in foreign trade 
and FDI focus on the different organizational strategies of firms. According to the seminal 
work of Coase (1937), when firms grow, the cost of organizing additional transactions 
increases and the entrepreneur may not allocate production factors efficiently; in this case, it 
is possible that the loss in resources will be greater than the cost of the transaction through 
the market.  
 
Most of the literature on the decision to relocate activity, internalizing the process through 
FDI, or through subcontracting, revolves around transaction costs (Williamson, 1975). 
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 Transaction cost economics has shown how to distribute activities over market and firm in a 
way to minimize internal and external transaction costs. Internalization appears when the 
degree of asset specificity and uncertainty is so high that the different parts need a high level 
of cooperation and adaptation. On the other hand, subcontracting capitalizes on supplier 
specialization and scale economies; it offers greater flexibility in the case of market 
fluctuations and, in general, lowers both management costs and labour costs (Williamson, 
2005). Firms consider externalization as opposed to internalization when incentives in the 
form of co-specialization and organizational learning are reaped and transaction costs are 
reduced (Kedia & Mukherjee, 2009). In every case the advantages of internalising a market 
must be compared to the costs. Where costs exceed benefits, markets will not be internalised 
and market solutions (external licensing, outsourcing) will be sought (Buckley, 2009).  
 
Cost motives are often considered to be the most important driver for offshoring. In the past, 
cost advantages were used to maintain and increase competitiveness in comparison to local 
suppliers, but nowadays confronted with increasing competition from overseas firms, 
European and US firms increasingly offshore their operations to countries that offer 
significant labor cost advantages (Farrell, 2004). Stratman (2008) points that although wage 
rates in the leading offshoring locations are rising, it will be a long time before wage parity is 
reached. In the past few years, companies have become aware that they can reduce costs by 
moving jobs to lower-wage locations and by reorganizing their production processes and 
supply chains globally (Farrell, 2004). Optimizing global production will lead to lower costs, 
which in turn will lead to substantially lower prices for consumers, expanding the market for 
goods, and creating new business opportunities (Farrell, 2005). 
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 Most of the empirical literature on offshoring determinants investigates the characteristics of 
firms that perform these activities; some of these studies have confirmed the importance of 
costs in the decision to offshore. Marin (2006) conducted an empirical study related to 
outsourcing and offshoring determinants for 2,200 FDI projects from 660 German and 
Austrian firms in Eastern Europe.1 The results show that German firms want to offshore to 
low wage countries when labour costs are high. Tomiura (2005) investigated the 
characteristics of firms that outsource part of their production across national borders, using 
micro data from 118,300 companies. The empirical results prove that firms whose products 
are more labour-intensive show a higher probability of outsourcing, revealing the pressure to 
cut high labour costs. In addition, firms with higher size, human skills and experience with 
FDI are more likely to offshore, revealing the existence of entry costs.  
 
Using a different approach, Feenstra & Hanson (2001) examine how firms respond to import 
competition and how these responses are transmitted to the labour market. In their view, an 
increase in imports from low-wage countries prompts the offshoring of non-skill-intensive 
activities. The empirical analysis also shows a high correlation between industries with large 
imports of final goods and industries with large imports of intermediate inputs, which is 
consistent with the idea that outsourcing is a response to import competition from low-wage 
countries.  
 
Initially developed in the manufacturing sector, this trend is gradually permeating the service 
sector. Lewin & Peeters (2006b) found that reduce costs was the most important strategic 
driver for offshoring of administrative and technical work to low-cost countries and in 75 per 
cent of cases companies achieved or exceed their expectations. At the same time the growing 
                                                 
1 Such as vertical integration or internalization. 
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 pressure to reduce labour costs and improve efficiency induces many organizations to 
undertake shared services organization (Aksin & Masini, 2008). Roza et al. (2011) show that 
costs drivers, especially labour costs, are the most important determinants in the decision to 
offshore. 
 
Firms consider offshoring as a strategy that moves beyond gaining cost advantages. We 
formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
H1- Cost-cutting objectives are important drivers to relocate activity abroad. 
H1.1- Operating performance is worse in international insourcing firms, what increases the 
pressure to reduce costs through offshoring. 
H1.2- Firms with labour-intensive activities will be more likely to relocate activity abroad to 
cut high labour costs. 
H1.3- Firms in those industries with more imports from low-wage countries to be more likely 
to relocate activity abroad. 
 
2.2 ‘The best’ firms offshore 
 
There is evidence that offshoring firms differ from non-offshoring firms. For example, Görg, 
Greenaway & Kneller (2008) investigating the type of enterprises that engage in offshoring 
activities, expected that only a certain group, ‘the best’ firms, were capable of offshoring. The 
main reason for this assumption is sunk costs, which are costs related to the search for a 
foreign partner, market research and contractual arrangements etc.. The same argument 
applies to any form of foreign market entry, whether exporting, direct investment or 
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 offshoring. Consequently, only efficient firms and high-performing enterprises will be able to 
overcome these sunk costs and successfully start offshore activities.  
 
Grossman & Helpman (2002), Antràs & Helpman (2004) and Helpman (2006) focus their 
interest on the relationship between trade and firm productivity. They consider that 
transaction costs, asset specificity and incomplete contracts play an important role in the 
“make or buy decision”. In deciding on one industrial structure – vertical integration or 
outsourcing – the firm has to choose between having a large, less specialized organization, 
with higher production and control costs, or looking for a suitable partner and negotiating the 
incentives. One central result from their models is that firms with low productivity source in 
the domestic market, and firms with high productivity source in foreign markets. The main 
reason for this outcome is that the fixed costs of integrating or outsourcing abroad are higher 
than the costs of integrating or outsourcing at home (Antràs & Helpman, 2004).   
 
Empirical literature show that firms whose productivity is higher and firms more active in 
R+D tend to be more involved in offshoring (Görg & Hanley, 2004; Görg, Hanley & Strobl, 
2008; Tomiura, 2005). In later work, Tomiura (2007) studies the productivity variation with 
globalization modes (export, international outsourcing and/or FDI), finding that firms 
offshoring a part of their activities are more productive than foreign outsourcers and 
exporters, which in turn are more productive than domestic firms. 
 
Related to size Roza et al. (2011) use multi-country data to study firm size impact on a firm’s 
offshoring strategy. Although larger companies may benefit of their scale advantages, 
offshoring is a strategy offering advantages to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), as 
setup costs are relatively low and their suppliers also create scale advantages for them. This 
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 makes it possible to produce their specialist products at competitive levels. However, this will 
not fully compensate their limited material advantages compared to large firms, for example 
financial and technological resources, for this reason larger firms are likely more able to gain 
cost advantages from offshoring (Roza et al. 2011, p.3). Wagner (2010) also shows that 
offshoring firms are larger. 
 
Head & Ries (2002) used a large panel set of Japanese manufacturing firms to investigate the 
effects of offshore employment on skill composition in Japan. Their empirical results provide 
evidence consistent with vertical specialization. FDI in low-income countries appear to raise 
skill intensity at home but this effect falls as investment shifts towards high-income countries. 
This is consistent with low-skill activities being transferred to low-income countries and 
high-skill activities to high income countries. Feenstra & Hanson (1996) argue that 
outsourcing has contributed to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour in the 
United States. In their view, an increase in imports from low-wage countries prompts the 
offshoring of non-skill-intensive activities shifting employment toward skilled workers 
within industries (Feenstra & Hanson, 2001). Wagner (2010) also found a positive link 
between human capital intensity and offshoring, and Díaz-Mora (2008) proved that 
outsourcing is closely related to skill requirements. 
 
Empirical works such as Görg & Hanley (2004) and Görg, Handley & Strobl (2008) 
introduce export propensity pointing that exports may have a positive effect on offshoring 
due to the international experience. Wagner (2010) results’ show that offshoring firms have a 
higher share of exports in total sales than non-relocating firms and in Díaz-Mora (2008) 
export propensity shows a positive and significant coefficient. We formulate the following 
hypotheses: 
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H2- ‘The best’ firms self-select to offshoring. 
H2.1- Firms with higher productivity are more likely to engage in international insourcing. 
H2.2- Firms more active in R+D are more involved in offshore insourcing. 
H2.3- Larger firms are more likely to relocate activity abroad. 
H2.4- Firms with greater human capital intensity are more prone to international insourcing. 
H2.5- Export firms are more likely to engage in international insourcing. 
 
2.3 Multinational companies and offshoring 
 
Traditionally, internationalization has been a stepwise process in which firms first export 
products and services, then transfer parts of their production to serve foreign markets, and 
finally re-import products back to the home country (Hutzschenreuter, Lewin & Dresel, 
2011). 
 
As mentioned earlier in 2.1, in the decision to relocate company activities boundaries are 
determined by the interaction between ‘production’ costs and ‘governance’ costs 
(Williamson, 1985; Buckley, 2009). Firms with higher multinational experience may be 
expected to prefer investment modes of entry (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). The 
multinational companies attain advantages through both vertical and horizontal integration. 
They are able to segment their activities and to seek the optimal location for each activity. At 
the same time multinational enterprises are also able to coordinate these activities by means 
of a wide variety of mechanisms from wholly owned FDI through licensing and 
subcontracting (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004).  
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 Supply chain management has emerged as an important factor in the competitive success of 
multinational enterprises. Multinational firms are able to combine technologies from multiple 
locations in order to create customer solutions (Teece, 2006). Foreign firms, which are 
assumed to be part of a larger multinational company, can be expected to use higher levels of 
technology than domestic firms, due to easy access to the parent firm’s specific assets 
(Tomiura, 2005). At the same time, these firms’ relationships with the parent firm and other 
subsidiaries abroad facilitate the disintegration of production structures (Girma & Görg, 
2004). We formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H3- Foreign firms are more likely to relocate activity to a foreign country than domestic 
firms are. 
 
Are these hypotheses applicable to Spain? In Spain there are few empirical studies of the 
offshoring determinants of manufacturing industries and, to our knowledge, all those that do 
exist focus on outsourcing determinants, Gandoy & Díaz-Mora (2007) provide a review for 
Spanish empirical literature. Díaz-Mora (2008) showed the high degree of persistence in 
outsourcing strategy and the positive link between outsourcing, unit labour cost and firms’ 
orientation to external markets. Holl (2008) results show that firms that pay high wages and 
are larger and older, are more likely to engage in outsourcing activities. In addition, firms in 
industry agglomerations are more likely to subcontract. Fariñas & Martín-Marcos (2010) 
conclude that high-productivity firms source intermediate inputs in international markets, 
whereas low-productivity firms acquire them at home. The authors report evidence for self-
selection, i.e. that high-productivity firms are more likely to engage in global production 
strategies. 
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 3. Data and Model  
 
We aim to analyse international insourcing determinants using a data base of firms that 
offshore production activity to foreign countries and firms that do not offshore. For data base 
design we dispose of two types of data, one containing offshoring information and the other 
containing information on annual accounts (for up to 10 years, consolidated and 
unconsolidated), financial ratios, activities and ownership for approximately 1,201,000 
companies throughout Spain. The latter is called “Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos 
(SABI)”, managed by Bureau Van Dijk.2 
 
The offshoring information was obtained from the research group “Foreign Capital, Location 
and Delocation” at the University Complutense of Madrid. We dispose information from 141 
firms that have taken one of the following three actions: announce a redundancy plan 
(Spanish acronym ERE), close down, close a plant, or close a product line in Spain, in order 
to transfer production to a foreign country, between 1999 and 2005.3 To these 141 firms we 
add a sample of firms that do not offshore, to analyse some differences between the former 
and the latter.  
 
With the selection of the sample of non-offshoring firms we want to guarantee that both 
groups (offshoring and non-offshoring firms) represent the same industry structure and they 
are similar size firms. Both groups of firms are similar, but some offshore and others do not.  
 
                                                 
2 SABI is a part of the European Amadeus data base, but has information only for Spanish and Portuguese 
companies. 
3 In an ERE the firm or the workers’ representatives ask the employment authorities to suspend or terminate the 
working relationship between the firm and its employees, without jeopardizing the workers’ rights. 
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 One main trait of the offshore insourcing firms is that they have the highest employment 
levels. We analyse the variable number of workers in each industry and we see that offshore 
firms have a number of workers located in the upper quartile of this variable. Therefore, for 
the sample selection of non-offshore firms, first, we select in SABI all non-offshore firms in 
each sector in which our 141 international insourcing firms operate (corresponding to the 4-
digit level of NACE, National Activities Classification Economics). Second, we eliminate the 
non-offshore firms with a number of workers lower than the third quartile of this variable in 
each industry. Finally, we select 25% non-offshore firms from the total, using stratified 
random sampling, where each stratus corresponds to a sector.  
 
The SABI data base does not contains information about offshore, but we can deduce this 
information, if a firm remains in the SABI data base throughout the period analysed and its 
number of workers does not change significantly, we can conclude that it is a non-offshore 
firm. 
 
3.1 The variables 
 
Table 1 describes the variables used in the data model. The individual information for firms is 
obtained from the SABI data base and is measured in different ways, depending on whether 
they offshore or not. For non-offshoring firms, we calculate the mean of individual 
information for the period 1999-2005.4 For offshore insourcing firms, to maintain the 
exogeneity of the explicative variables, we calculate the mean for the available years until the 
year “before” the announcement of international insourcing in the media, when the company 
                                                 
4 The SABI data base does not always have information for all the years in the period; in these cases we 
calculate the average for the years available. 
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 had already decided to move all or part of its production to a third country. The variable OFF, 
which differentiates firms that offshore or firms that do not, is equal to 1 if the firm moves 
productive activity to a foreign country (international insourcing) and 0 if it does not.  
 
To test cost-cutting determinants of offshoring three variables are calculated. First the Profit 
variable as a proxy for operating performance. We would expect a worse operating 
performance in international insourcing firms. Paul & Wooster (2010) found that firms that 
outsource in foreign countries had worse operating performance, higher administrative costs 
and greater labour intensity. Second, the KvsL variable measures the capital-labour ratio 
(Tomiura, 2005); here, we would expect that firms with labour-intensive activities are more 
likely to relocate activity abroad than other firms. Finally, as we have no information about 
imports at a company level (Feenstra & Hanson, 2001) for all firms, offshoring and non-
offshoring, we calculate an industry-level proxy for imports, measured as the sector imports 
with origin in East European countries, the Maghreb, Turkey and Asia, which represent 78% 
of all offshore insourcing destinations, divided by total sector imports, for the period 1999-
2005.  
 
To ascertain ‘the best’ firms, we use five determinants: Productivity, R+D intensity, Export, 
Size and Human Capital. Productivity is measured as sales amount divided by number of 
workers. The effect of firms’ R+D intensity is represented through three binary variables f1, 
f2 and f3. Binary variable f1 takes value 1 if the activity of the firm is considered low 
technology-intensive, f2 takes value 1 if the activity of the firm is considered medium-high 
technology-intensive and 0 if not; and f3 takes value 1 if the activity of the firm is considered 
high technology-intensive and 0 if not. To define exports we obtain a dummy variable 
16
 (Export) which takes on value 1 if the firm exports and 0 if the firm does not. The last, 
Human Capital, is measured as personal expenses per worker.  
 
The Foreign variable is an ownership dummy equal to 1 if the firm is considered foreign and 
0 if it is considered domestic, it is obtained to test if foreign firms are more likely to relocate 
activity to a foreign country than domestic firms. The Firm Age variable is used to represent 
the effect of learning over time.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables in the data base (presented in Table 
1). For all variables the median is lower than the mean, indicating the positive skewness of all 
variables, i.e. more firms below than above the mean. 
 
In Table 3 we present the frequencies of firms’ international insourcing following the 
classification of R+D intensity industries provided by the OECD, which would mainly 
consider the industries used as follows: electronic equipment – high technology; transport 
equipment, chemicals, machinery and electrical equipment – medium-high technology, and 
finally textile, clothing, leather and footwear, food and beverages, metal, paper, printing and 
publishing – low technology. The chi-square statistic to test if to offshore or not is 
independent of R+D intensity is significant at 1%, indicating the existence of a relationship 
between the category of both variables. We observe that the propensity to offshore insourcing 
increases with technological intensity, given that for low technology only 1.24% of firms 
relocate, for the medium-high technology 4.24% offshore insource and for high technology 
industries the percentage increases to 9.05%. 
17
  
Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics for non-offshoring firms (OFF=0) and for offshore 
insourcing firms (OFF= 1). We also test if there are significant differences between the 
means of variables in offshoring and non-offshoring firms; for this we use the Student t 
statistic to compare groups with different variances. This descriptive indicates that firms that 
offshore are older, are larger, have more human capital and profit. Moreover, most of the 
firms are exporters and foreign-owned. 
 
The inference shows that the productivity, import intensity and capital-labour ratio are not 
different between offshoring and non-offshoring firms. After, we see that when we consider 
the combined effect of all variables and some interactions these variables explain the 
differences between firms. For this, we specify a logit model for analyzing the determinants 
of propensity to offshore. 
( )
Foreign).Export,Imports,ty,ProductiviKvsL,Profit,
Capital,Human Size, Age, Firm,(1 DRFOFFP +==
 
Where ( )·F  is the logistic cumulative distribution function:  
( ) ( )( ) .exp1
exp
t
ttF +=  
 
4. Results and discussion  
 
With the data base described above, we estimate 4 logit models. In all cases the dependent 
variable is OFF, which is equal to 1 if the firm moves productive activity to a foreign country 
(international insourcing) and 0 if it does not. The results are shown in Table 5.  
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 Model 1 in Table 5 includes all the variables described in Table 1. As the variable, human 
capital (Human Capital), shows a correlation with capital-labour intensity (KvsL) bigger than 
0.8 and with the variable profits (Profit) bigger than 0.5, we eliminate human capital 
explanatory variable in models 2 and 4, to avoid the multi-colinearity problems.  
 
In Table 5, Model 1 shows that the significant parameters, at least at 5%, are those associated 
with R+D intensity (f2 and f3), firm size variables (Size, Size2), Profit, Imports and Foreign. 
The parameter associated with the variable capital/labour intensity (KvsL) is significant at 
10%.  
 
In Model 2, on elimination of the human capital variable, the parameter associated with the 
productivity variable becomes significant at 10%. In Model 3, when we drop the R+D effect 
(f2 and f3), the parameter associated with human capital is now significant at 10%. Finally, in 
Model 4, on elimination of the effect of R+D and human capital variables, productivity is 
again significant at 10%. For all significant parameters, the signs are as expected in the 
hypotheses we formulated.  
 
Using the results obtained in Table 5, we analyse the support for the hypotheses formulated in 
section two.  
 
The hypothesis H1 points to cost-cutting determinants to relocate activity abroad. We observe 
that firms with worse operating performance (H1.1) and high labour intensity (H1.2) are 
more likely to carry out international insourcing; cost-saving through offshoring constitutes a 
decisive strategy for all the firms in the sample. Industries with higher imports from low-
wage countries (H1.3) also show a higher propensity to relocate in these countries proving 
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 that for most firms international insourcing is a response to import competition from 
countries with locational advantages, such as labour costs, for example firms in textiles, 
clothing, leather and footwear, and food and beverages, which face strong competition from 
Asian and north African products in the domestic market.  
 
In relation to H2 are these firms the ‘the best’ ones”? First of all and corroborating the 
theoretical models of Antràs & Helpman (2004) and Helpman (2006), firms with higher 
productivity are more likely to relocate activity abroad (H2.1). Second, firms more active in 
R+D tend to be involved in more extensive international insourcing (H2.2).  
 
Related to size (H2.3) the larger the size of the firm, the greater the probability of vertical 
integration abroad. However, the negative parameter associated with the variable, Size2, 
shows that the effect is non-linear, as the effect decreases as size increases. Larger firms have 
a greater capacity to establish and manage offshoring activities. Higher human capital 
intensity (H2.4) is positively associated with firms that insourse internationally, especially by 
the investment in production facilities in low income countries, vertical specialization to low 
income countries appears to raise skill intensity at home. However, firm age and export 
experience (H2.5) have no statistical significance.  
 
Foreign firms (H3) are more likely to relocate activity to a foreign country. Their 
multinational experiences allow them to fragment their activities and to seek the optimal 
location for each activity. Finally business experience, which makes it easier for longer-
established firms to find suitable locations, suppliers and partners when necessary, has no 
statistical significance.  
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 To delve deeper into Table 5 results, we studied the determinants and firm characteristics for 
the two groups separately: foreign and national firms. Table 6 gives the frequencies of firms’ 
international insourcing following the classification of foreign and national. In the columns 
we can see that 73.76% of firms that offshore are foreign, along the rows we can see that only 
the 0.64% of national firms offshore while 18.98% of foreign firms engage in offshore 
insourcing. Given that offshoring rates are higher for foreign firms, in Table 7 we calculated 
the same four models as in Table 5, but now only for foreign firms. In general terms, all 
parameters appear significant at least at 5%, except f2 (medium-high technology-intensive 
firms), firm age and exports. Thus, though the results in Table 7 are roughly the same as in 
Table 5, their level of significance is much higher.  
 
The relationship of foreign firms with the parent company and other subsidiaries abroad 
facilitates the disintegration of production structures, as shown by the fact that nearly 74% of 
the insource offshoring firms from the sample are foreign firms. Some studies already 
mentioned, such as Girma & Görg (2004) and Tomiura (2005), also obtained empirical 
evidence on the offshoring activities of multinationals. The estimations of Tomiura (2005) 
show that firms with own affiliates overseas are four times more likely to choose foreign 
offshoring than firms without experience in FDI. Our results prove that self-selection of ‘the 
best’ firms and cost-cutting determinants are much more significant in foreign firms, and this 
significance is especially more pronounced in productivity. 
 
However, when we calculated the same four models only for national firms, in Table 8, some 
parameters that appeared significant in the calculation for all firms (Table 5) and for foreign 
firms (Table 7) have no statistical significance, i.e. human capital, capital-labour intensity and 
productivity. On the other hand, the parameter associated with variable exports appears 
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 significant and positive (Table 8). As national firms oriented to international markets face 
more pressure to improve efficiency and competitiveness, their international experience 
seems to be advantageous when moving production abroad.   
 
All the same, although results are not as sound as for foreign firms, national firms with lower 
profits and more imports from low-wage countries are more prone to relocate activity to 
foreign countries, which mean that costs remain an important determinant. In addition, these 
are the ‘the best’ firms (larger, more technology-intensive and exporters), as against national 
firms that do not offshore.  
 
Finally, Table 9 shows the firm traits hypothesis and the results in tables 7 and 8, for foreign 
firms, for national firms and for all firms. As the Table 9 illustrates, our estimation results 
prove that most of the firms fulfil the established hypotheses. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This study analyzes firm characteristics associated with the probability of relocate activities 
in a foreign country, using Spanish manufacturing firms’ micro data for the 1999-2005 
period.  This paper contributes to a major knowledge of the determinants of offshore 
insourcing (captive offshoring) and provides empirical evidence from firm level data, by 
using unique data for Spanish manufacturing firms. Given the strong link between foreign 
direct investment in manufacturing industries during the eighties and the subsequent role of 
multinationals in offshore insourcing, Spain constitutes a good laboratory case study.  
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 The results of our paper provide immediate answers for a number of the questions raised at 
the beginning. First, we show that international insourcing practices by manufacturing firms 
in Spain are much more likely to be cost driven. Firms with high labor intensity, worse 
operating performance and imports from low-wage countries are more likely to carry out 
international insourcing. 
 
Second, we found that firms with higher productivity, that are more active in R+D, that are 
larger and that have greater human capital intensity are more likely to relocate activity 
abroad, i.e. ‘the best’ firms self-select to offshore insourcing activities.  
 
Third, we noted the special prominence of foreign firms among those that engage in 
international insourcing. Our results prove that self-selection of ‘the best’ firms are much 
more significant in foreign firms, in particular related to productivity. For national firms we 
observed a self-selection of exporters into international insourcing, confirming that 
international experience is a key factor in the moving of production abroad. 
 
Our results suggest that firms need to be financially viable in an increasingly competitive 
global environment. In this context, the relocation of production as a form of corporate 
restructuring will increase in near future. 
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Table 1: Variables in the data base 
 
Variable Description 
OFF Equal to 1 if the firm offshore and 0 otherwise 
Firm Age Number of years between year of creation and 
2005 
Size Number of workers/1,000  
Human Capital Personal expenses per worker 
KvsL Tangible fixed assets divided by number of 
workers 
Profit Profit before tax 
Productivity Sales divided by number of workers 
Export Equal to 1 if the firm exports and 0 otherwise 
Foreign Equal to 1 if the firm is foreign and 0 if it is 
domestic. We consider a firm as foreign when 
its capital participation is at least 10%  
Imports Share of industry imports from East European 
countries, Maghrib, Turkey and Asiaa 
(Datacomex, foreign trade statistics) 
f1 Equal to 1 if the firm activity is considered 
traditional and 0 otherwise  
f2 Equal to 1 if the firm activity is considered 
medium-high technology-intensive and 0 
otherwise 
f3 Equal to 1 if the firm activity is considered 
high technology-intensive and 0 otherwise 
aIndustry imports with origin in India, Vietnam, China, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Poland, Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco  
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 Table 2: Descriptive statistics for all firms, sample size N=6335 
 
VARIABLE Mean STD Median 
Firm Age 20.1972 13.9137 18 
Size 0.1019 0.4798 0.0311 
Human Capital 26.1556 78.6493 21.9300 
Profit 0.9228 7.9549 0.0547 
KvsL 39.4138 206.1219 17.1935 
Productivity 160.9491 1321.4850 91.4259 
Imports 5.3417 5.1260 3.7060 
Export 0.3943 0.4887 0 
Foreign 0.0865 0.2811 0 
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 Table 3: Cross frequencies between RD activity and offshore insourcing 
 
  OFF 
Frequencies 
% total 
% row 
% column OFF=0 OFF=1 Total 
4546 57 4603 
71.76 0.9 72.66 
98.76 1.24   
Low Technology 
Level Industries 
73.39 40.43   
1447 64 1511 
22.84 1.01 23.85 
95.76 4.24   
Medium-High 
Technology Level 
Industries 
23.36 45.39   
201 20 221 
3.17 0.32 3.49 
90.95 9.05   
High Technology 
Level Industries 
3.25 14.18   
6194 141 6335 Total 
97.77 2.23 100 
χ2= 95.96*** to test independence between variables. 
Significance levels: * 10%, **5% and ***1% 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for OFF=0 (sample size N=6194) and for OFF=1 (sample size 
N=141) 
 OFF=0 OFF=1 
VARIABLE Mean STD Median Mean STD Median 
Firm Age *** 20.0179 13.6836 18 28.0709 20.2991 23 
Size*** 0.0793 0.3207 0.0306 1.0938 2.2028 0.3563 
Human Capital*** 25.9557 79.4669 21.7410 34.9357 20.7892 30.5000 
Profit** 0.8014 6.4029 0.0540 6.2562 31.9393 0.62639 
KvsL 39.3725 208.3402 16.9765 41.2280 46.0077 28.2201 
Productivity 142.4317 350.7107 90.3250 974.4018 8537.3373 153.7230 
Imports 5.3282 5.1054 3.7060 5.9357 5.9538 3.7300 
Export*** 0.3863 0.4869 0 0.7447 0.4376 1 
Foreign*** 0.07168 0.2580 0 0.7376 0.4415 1 
Significance levels: * 10%, **5% and ***1%  
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Table 5: Estimation results for all firms 
 
Coefficients MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
Intercept -6.7054*** -6.6555*** -6.3643*** -6.2618*** 
f2 0.5095* 0.5205*   
f3 1.5069*** 1.5628***   
Firm Age -0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0008 
Size 2.4903*** 2.4799*** 2.5252*** 2.5139*** 
Size2 -0.1557*** -0.1554*** -0.1580*** -0.1579*** 
Human Capital 0.0037  0.0057*  
Profit -0.0346*** -0.0341*** -0.0356*** -0.0351*** 
KvsL -0.0035* -0.0029 -0.0043* -0.0035* 
Productivity 0.0003 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0004* 
Imports 0.1225*** 0.1225*** 0.0965*** 0.0954*** 
Export 0.2557 0.2550 0.3163 0.3167 
Foreign 3.4657*** 3.4840*** 3.5790*** 3.6066*** 
N=6335 χ2=569.6592*** χ2=568.7791*** χ2=554.9322*** χ2=552.6893*** 
Significance levels: * 10%, **5% and ***1% 
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Table 6: Cross frequencies between national or foreign and offshore insourcing 
 
  OFF 
Frequencies 
% total 
% row 
% column OFF=0 OFF=1 Total 
5750 37 5787 
90.77 0.58 91.35 
99.36 0.64   
National 
92.83 26.24   
444 104 548 
7.01 1.64 8.65 
81.02 18.98   
Foreign 
7.17 73.76   
6194 141 6335 Total 
97.77 2.23 100 
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Table 7: Estimation results for foreign firms 
 
Coefficients MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
Intercept -3.4901*** -3.3186*** -3.1169*** -2.8045*** 
f2 0.3299 0.3565   
f3 1.3206** 1.4950**   
Firm Age -0.0044 -0.0034 -0.0049 -0.0034 
Size 6.4655*** 6.3747*** 6.4178*** 6.2778*** 
Size2 -0.4092*** -0.4049*** -0.4060*** -0.3989*** 
Human Capital 0.0092*  0.0125**  
Profit -0.0943*** -0.0909*** -0.0934*** -0.0886** 
KvsL -0.0100** -0.0077** -0.0115** -0.0089** 
Productivity 0.0006** 0.0007** 0.0005** 0.0006** 
Imports 0.1274*** 0.1285*** 0.1052*** 0.1034*** 
Export -0.3209 -0.3227 -0.3093 -0.3077 
N=548 χ2=196.2040*** χ2=193.4282*** χ2=190.0533*** χ2=185.2060*** 
Significance levels: * 10%, **5% and ***1% 
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Table 8: Estimation results for national firms 
 
Coefficients MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
Intercept -7.1699*** -7.1774*** -6.5452*** -6.5230*** 
f2 1.3456** 1.3437**   
f3 1.8892** 1.8877**   
Firm Age -0.0031 -0.0032 0.0009 0.0009 
Size 2.3277*** 2.3268*** 2.5001*** 2.5027*** 
Size2 -0.2256*** -0.2254*** -0.2496*** -0.2500*** 
Human Capital 
 
-0.0006  0.0014  
Profit -0.0551** -0.0552** -0.0598** -0.0596** 
KvsL 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 
Productivity 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 
Imports 0.1439*** 0.1440*** 0.0926*** 0.0921*** 
Export 0.7144* 0.7157* 0.9534** 0.9511** 
N=548 χ2=67.5353*** χ2=67.5325*** χ2=57.6058*** χ2=57.5800***
Significance levels: * 10%, **5% and ***1% 
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Table 9: Firm traits and hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis Foreign Firms National Firms All Firms 
H1.1- Worse operating performance  Yes Yes  
H1.2- Higher labour-intensity Yes No  
H1.3- Imports from low-wage countries Yes Yes  
H2.1- Higher productivity Yes No  
H2.2- Higher R+D intensity Yes Yes  
H2.3- Larger firms Yes Yes  
H2.4- Greater human capital intensity  Yes No  
H2.5- Export firms No Yes  
H3- Foreign firms   Yes 
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